General Maxwell, with the Jersey Brigade, was ordered to take post about Mount Holly and to unite with Major-General Dickenson, who was assembling the militia for the purpose of breaking down bridges, falling trees in the roads, and otherwise embarassing the march of the British General. Instructions were given to these officers to guard carefully against a coup de main, and to keep the militia in small, light parties on his flanks.
When Washington learned that the greater proportion
of the British army had crossed the Delaware,** he
convened a council of general officers to determine on his
course. The force of the armies was nearly equal, the
numerical advantage being with the Americans; the
British having ten and the Americans between ten and
eleven thousand. Of seventeen general officers, Wayne
and Cadwalader alone were decidedly in favor of attacking
the enemy. La Fayette inclined to that opinion
----------
* The History of New Jersey from its Discovery by Europeans to the adoption
of the Federal Constitution. By Thomas F. Gordon, Trenton. Published by Daniel
Fenton, 1834.
** June 18, 1778.
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without openly embracing it. Consequently it was
resolved not to risk a battle.
Sir Henry Clinton moved with great deliberation, seeming to await the approach of his adversary. He proceeded through Haddonfield,*** Mount Holly, Slabtown and Crosswicks to Allentown and Imlaystown, which he reached on the twenty-fourth.
Dickinson and Maxwell retired before him, unable to obstruct his march otherwise than by destroying the bridges. As his route, until he passed Crosswicks, lay directly up the Delaware, and at no great distance from it, General Washington found it necessary to make an extensive circuit to pass the river at Coryell's Ferry. Pursuant to the settled plan of avoiding an engagement he kept the high grounds, directing his army so as to cover the important passes of the Highlands. He crossed the river on the twenty-second, and remained the twenty-third at Hopewell, in elevated country, adjacent to the river.
General Arnold, whose wounds yet unfitted him for service, was directed to possess himself of Philadelphia, and to detach four hundred continental troops and such militia as could be collected, to harass the rear of the enemy.
This service, by the order of the commander-in- chief, was confided to General Cadwalader, who could only add to his continental force fifty volunteers and forty militia, commanded by General Lacy. From Hopewell, Morgan, with six hundred riflemen, was detached to annoy his right flank; Dickenson, with about one thousand Jersey militia, and Maxwell's brigade, hung on his left.
In this position of the armies General Washington,
who had rather acquiesced in than approved the decision
of the late council of war, and was disposed to seek battle,
again submitted the proposal to the consideration of
the general officers, by whom it was again negatived.
----------
*** The night that the British encamped at Haddon field, Captain McLane, by
order from General Arnold, passed through their camp, and reported their situation
to the General.
----------
By their advice a chosen body of fifteen hundred men,
under Brigadier-General Scott, was added to the corps
on the left flank of the enemy. But Washington being
supported by the wishes of some officers whom he highly
valued, determined on his own responsibility, to bring on
a general engagement. The enemy being on his March
to Monmouth Court-House, he resolved to strengthen
the force on his lines by despatching General Wayne
with an additional corps of one thousand men. The
Continental troops now thrown in front of the army
amounted to four thousand men, a force sufficient to
require the direction of a major-general. The tour of
duty was General Lee's, but he having declared strongly
against hazarding even a partial engagement, and supposing
that in conformity with the advice signed by all
the generals in camp, save one, nothing would be attempted
beyond reconnoitering the enemy and restraining
the plundering parties, showed no disposition to assert
his claim, but yielded the command to General LaFayette.
All the continental parties on the lines were
placed under his direction, with orders to take measures
in concert with General Dickenson, to impede the march
of the British and to occasion them the greatest loss.
These measures demonstrated the wishes of the commander-in-chief,
tending almost inevitably to a general
battle. Wayne had earnestly advised it, and La Fayette
inclined towards a partial engagement. Colonel Hamilton,
who accompanied him, had the strongest desire to
signalize the detachment, and to accomplish all the
wishes of Washington. These dispositions having been
made, the main army was moved to Cranberry on the
twenty-sixth, to support the advance. The intense heat
of the weather, a heavy storm, and a temporary want of
provisions, prevented it from proceeding further next
day. The advance corps had pressed forward and taken
a position on the Monmouth road, about five miles in
the rear of the enemy, with the intention of attacking
him on the next morning. It was now, however, too remote
and too far on the right to be supported in case of
action; and, pursuant to orders, the Marquis filed off by
his left towards Englishtown, early in the morning of the
twenty-seventh.
General Lee had declined the command of the advance party, under the opinion that it was not designed for effective service; but perceiving soon after its march that much importance was attached to it, and dreading lest his reputation might suffer, he earnestly solicited to be placed at its head. To relieve his feelings, without wounding those of La Fayette, Washington detached the former with two other brigades to support the Marquis. Lee would, of course, have the direction of the whole front division, amounting now to five thousand men; but he stipulated that if any enterprise had been formed by La Fayette, it should be executed as if the commanding-officer had not been changed.
Sir Henry Clinton had taken a strong position on the high grounds about Monmouth Court House; having his right flank in the skirt of a small wood, his left secured by a thick one, and a morass toward his rear. His whole front was also covered by a wood, and for a considerable distance toward his left, by a morass, and he was within twelve miles of the high grounds about Middletown; after reaching which he would be perfectly secure.
Under these circumstances, General Washington determined to attack their rear, the moment they should move from their ground. This determination was communicated to Lee, with orders to make his disposition and to keep his troops constantly lying on their arms, that he might be in readiness to take advantage of the first movement. Corresponding orders were also given to the rear division.
About five in the morning of the twenty-eighth, intelligence was received from General Dickenson, that the front of the enemy was in motion. The troops were immediately under arms, and Lee was directed to move on and attack the rear, "unless there should be powerful reasons to the contrary." He was at the same time informed, that the main army would march to support him.
Sir Henry Clinton, perceiving that the Americans were in his neighborhood, changed the order of his march. The baggage was placed under the care of General Knyphausen, while the flower of this army, unincumbered, formed the rear division commanded by Lord Cornwallis; who, to avoid pressing upon Knyphausen, remained on his ground until about eight, and then descending from the heights of Freehold, into a plain of about three miles in extent, took up his line of march in rear of the front division.
General Lee made the dispositions necessary for executing his orders; and, soon after the rear of the enemy was in motion, prepared to attack it. General Dickenson had been directed to detach some of his best troops to co-operate with him, and Morgan to act on the enemy's right flank, but with so much caution as to be able readily to extricate himself and to form a junction with the main body.
Lee appeared on the heights of Freehold soon after the enemy had left them, and following the British into the plain gave orders to General Wayne to attack their covering party so as to halt them, but not to press them sufficiently to force them up to the main body, or to draw reinforcements from thence to their aid. In the meantime, he proposed to gain their front by a shorter road on their left, and entirely intercepting their communication with the line to bear them off before they could be assisted.
While in the execution of this design, a gentleman of General Washington's suite came up to gain intelligence, and to him Lee communicated his present object.
Sir Henry Clinton, soon after the rear division was in full march, observed a column of the Americans on his left flank. This being militia, was soon dispersed. When his rear guard had descended from the hill, it was followed by a corps; soon after which a cannonade upon it was commenced from some pieces commanded by Colonel Oswald, and at the same time lie received intelligence that a respectable force had shown itself on both his flanks. Believing a design to have been formed on his baggage, which in the defiles would he exposed, he determined in order to secure it to attack the troops in his rear so vigorously as to compel them to call off those on his flanks. This induced him to march back his whole rear division, which movement was making as Lee advanced for the purpose of reconnoitering to the front of the wood adjoining the plain. He soon perceived himself to have mistaken the force which formed the rear of the British, but he yet proposed to engage on that ground, although his judgment, as was afterwards stated by himself, on an inquiry into his conduct, disapproved of it; there being a morass immediately in his rear, which could not be passed without difficulty, and which would necessarily impede the arrival of reinforcements to his aid and embarass his retreat should he be finally overpowered.
This was about ten o'clock. While both armies were preparing for action, General Scott (as stated by General Lee), mistook an oblique march of an American column for a retreat, and in the apprehension of being abandoned left his position and repassed the ravine in his rear. Being himself of opinion that the ground on which the army was drawn up was by no means favorable to them, Lee did not correct the error Scott had com-committed, but directed the whole detachment to regain the heights they had passed. He was pressed by the enemy and the same slight skirmishing ensued during this retrograde movement, in which not much loss was sustained on either side.
When the first firing announced the commencement of the action, the rear division threw off their packs and advanced rapidly to support the front. As they approached the scene of action, Washington, who had received no intelligence from Lee notifying his retreat, rode forward, and about noon, after the army had marched five miles, to his utter astonishment and mortification, met the advanced corps retiring before the enemy with but having made a single effort to maintain their ground. Those whom he first fell in with neither understood the motives which had governed General Lee nor his present design, and could give no other information than that by his orders they had fled without fighting.
Washington rode to the rear of the division, which was closely pressed. There he met Lee, to whom he spoke in terms of some warmth, implying disapprobation of his conduct. He also gave immediate orders to the regiments commanded by Colonel Stewart and Lieutenant-Colonel Ramsay to form on a piece of ground which he deemed proper for the purpose of checking the enemy, who were advancing rapidly on them. General Lee was then directed to take proper measure with the residue of his force to stop the British column on that ground, and the Commander-in-chief rode back himself to arrange the rear division of the army. These orders were executed with firmness. A sharp conflict ensued, and when forced from the ground on which he had been placed, Lee brought off his troops in good order, and was then directed to form in the rear of Englishtown.
The check thus given the enemy, afforded time to draw up the left wing and second line of the American army on an eminence, partly in a wood, and partly in an open field, covered by a morass in front. Lord Sterling, who commanded the wing, brought up a detachment of artillery, under Lieutenant-Colonel Carrington, with some field pieces, which played with considerable effect upon the enemy, who had passed the morass and were pressing on to the charge. The pieces, with the aid of several parties of infantry detached for the purpose, effectually put a stop to their advance.
The American artillery were drawn up in the open field, and maintained their ground with admirable firmness under a heavy and persevering fire from the British.
The right wing was for the day commanded by General Greene. To expedite the march, and to prevent the enemy from turning the right flank, he had been ordered to file off by the new church, two miles from Englishtown, and to fall into the Monmouth road a small distance in the rear of the court house, while the residue of the army proceeded directly to that place. He had advanced on this road considerably to the right of and rather beyond the ground on which the armies were now engaged, when he was informed of the retreat of Lee, and of the new disposition of the troops. He immediately changed his route and took an advantageous position on the right.
Warmly opposed in front the enemy attempted to turn the left flank of the American army, but were repulsed and driven back by parties of infantry. They then attempted the right with as little success. General Greene had advanced a body of troops, with artillery, to a commanding piece of ground in his front, which not only marred their design of turning the right, but severely enfiladed the party which yet remained in front of the left wing. At this moment, General Wayne advanced with a body of infantry in front, who kept up so hot and well directed a fire of musketry that the British soon gave way and withdrew behind the ravine to the ground on which the first halt had been made.
Here the British line was formed on very strong ground. Both flanks were secured by thick woods and morasses, while their front could be reached only through a narrow pass. The day had been intensely hot and the troops were much fatigued. Still, Washington resolved to renew the engagement. For this purpose Brigadier-General Poor, with his own and the Carolina brigade, gained the enemy's right flank, while Woodford, with his brigade, turned their left, and the artillery advanced on them in front. But the impediments on the flanks of the enemy were so considerable that before they could be overcome and the troops approach near enough to commence the attack it was nearly dark. Under these circumstances further operations were deferred until morning. The brigades on the flanks kept their ground through the night and the other troops lay on their arms in the field of battle in order to be in perfect readiness to support them. General Washington, who had through the day been extremely active, passed the night in his cloak in the midst of his soldiers.
In the meantime, the British were employed in removing their wounded. About midnight they marched away in such silence that their retreat was without the knowledge of General Poor, who lay very near them.
As it was perfectly certain that he would gain the high grounds about Middletown before they could be overtaken, where they could not be attacked with advantage as the face of the country afforded no prospect of opposing their embarkation; and as the battle, already fought, had terminated favorably to the reputation of the American arms, it was thought advisable to relinquish the pursuit. Leaving the Jersey brigade, Morgan's corps and M'Lane's command to hover about them, to countenance desertion, and protect the country from their depredations, it was resolved to move the main body of the army to the Hudson, and take a position which should effectually cover the important passes in the Highlands.
The loss of the Americans was eight officers and sixty-one privates killed, and about one hundred and sixty wounded.
Among the slain were Lieut.-Colonel Bonner, of Pennsylvania, and Major Dickinson, of Virginia, both much regretted. One hundred and thirty were missing; of whom many afterwards joined their regiments.
Sir Henry Clinton stated his dead and missing at four officers, and one hundred and eighty-four privates; his wounded at sixteen officers, and one hundred and fifty-four privates. This account, so far as respects the dead, cannot be correct, as four officers and two hundred and forty-five privates were buried on the held, and some few were afterwards found and buried, so as to increase the number to nearly three hundred. The uncommon heat of the day was fatal to several on both sides.
As usual when a battle has not been decisive, both parties claimed the victory. In the early part of the day the advantage was certainly with the British; in the latter part it may be pronounced with equal certainty to have been with the Americans. They maintained their ground, repulsed the enemy by whom they were attacked, were prevented only by the night, and the retreat of Sir Henry Clinton from renewing the action, and suffered in killed and wounded less than their adversaries.
Independent of the loss sustained in action the British army was considerably weakened in its way from Philadelphia to New York About one hundred prisoners were made, and near a thousand soldiers, principally foreigners, many of whom had married in Philadelphia, deserted the British standard during the march.
Whilst the armies were traversing the Jerseys, Gates, who commanded on the North River, by a well-timed and judicious movement down the Hudson, threatened New York for the purpose of restraining the garrison of that place from reinforcing Sir Henry Clinton, should such a measure be contemplated.
The conduct of Lee was generally disapproved. As, however, he had possessed a large share of the confidence of the commander-in-chief, it is probable that explanations might have been made which would have rescued him from the imputations cast on him, and have restored him to the esteem of the army, could his haughty temper have brooked the indignity he believed to have been offered him on the field of battle. General Washington had taken no measures in consequence of the events of that day and probably would have come to no resolution concerning them without an amicable explanation had he not received from Lee a letter, in very unbecoming terms, in which he manifestly assumed the station of a superior, and required reparation for the injury sustained from the very singular expressions said to have been used on the day of the action by the commander-in-chief.
This letter was answered by an assurance, that so soon as circumstances would admit of an inquiry, he should have an opportunity of justifying himself to the army, to America, and to the world in general, or of convincing them that he had been guilty of disobedience of orders, and misbehavior before the enemy. On the same day, on Lee's expressing a wish for a speedy investigation of his conduct, and for a court martial rather than a court of inquiry, he was arrested:
First, For disobedience of orders in not attacking the enemy on the 28th of June, agreeably to repeated instructions. Secondly, For misbehavior before the enemy on the same day, in making an unnecessary, disorderly and shameful retreat. Thirdly, For disrespect to the commander-in-chief in two letters. Before this correspondence had taken place, strong and specific charges of misconduct had been made against General Lee by several officers of his detachment, and particularly by Generals Wayne and Scott. In these the transactions of the day, not being well understood, were represented in colors much more unfavorable to Lee than facts would justify. These representations, most probably produced the strength of the expressions contained in the second article of the charge. A court martial was soon called, over which Lord Stirling presided; and after a full investigation, Lee was found guilty of all the charges exhibited against him, and sentenced to be suspended for one year. This sentence was afterwards, though with some hesitation, approved, almost unanimously by Congress. The court softened, in some degree, the severity of the second charge by finding him guilty, not in its very words, but of misbehavior before the enemy, by making an unnecessary, and, in some few instances, a disorderly retreat.
Lee defended himself with his accustomed ability. He suggested a variety of reasons justifying his retreat, which, if they do not absolutely establish its propriety, give it so questionable a form as to render it probable that a public examination would never have taken place, could his proud spirit have stooped to offer explanation instead of outrage, to the commander-in-chief.
From "Dawson's Battles of the United States," this most important incident of the day is thus described:
While General Washington's faithful and intelligent
secretary Colonel Harrison, was engagedin the front, endeavoring
to ascertain the cause of the retreat, General
Washington was not less active in seeking information
and in checking the retreat. Riding forward and accosting
the several commandants of regiments as he met
them, he received the same negative answers and the
same evidences of dissatisfaction that his secretary had
received, until in the rear of the retreating column he
met the commands of Colonels Ramsay and Stewart.
Calling these officers to him and telling them that he
"should depend upon them that day to give the enemy
a check," he directed General Wayne to form them with
two pieces of artillery on their right, and hold the enemy
in check. At this instant the guilty author of the mischief,
General Lee, rode up, and the commander-in-chief
demanded, in the sternest manner, "What is the meaning
of all this, sir?" Disconcerted and crushed under
the tone and terrible appearance of his chief, General
Lee could do nothing more than stammer, "Sir, sir?"
When, with more vehemence and with a still more indignant
expression, the question was repeated. A hurried
explanation was attempted - his troops had been misled
by contradictory intelligence, his officers had disobeyed
his orders, and he had not felt it his duty to oppose the
whole force of the enemy with the detachment under
his command. Further remarks were made on both
sides, and closing the interview with calling General Lee
a "damned poltroon,"* the commander-in-chief hastened
back to the high ground between the meeting house and
the bridge, where he formed the regiments of Colonels
Shreve, Patterson, Grayson, Livingston, Cilley and Ogden,
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* This statement is made on the authority of General La Fayette, who gave it on
the piazza of the residence of Vice-president Daniel D. Tompkins, Sunday morning,
August 15. 1824. General La Fayette referred to it as the only instance wherein
he had heard the General swear.
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and the left wing under Lord Stirling. When the
first line of troops had been formed on the heights, General
Washington rode up to General Lee and inquired in
a calmer tone, "Will you retain the command on this
height or not? If you will, I will return to the main
body and have it formed on the next height." General
Lee accepted the command; when, giving up the command,
General Washington remarked, "I expect you
will take proper means for checking the enemy," and
General Lee promised, "Your orders shall be obeyed;
and I shall not be the first to leave the ground."
The attention of General Washington was now turned, principally to the north River, towards which the march of his army was directed, with the intention of continuing some time about Haverstraw. And soon after he crossed the North River to White Plains.
After remaining a few days on the high grounds of Middletown, Sir Henry Clinton proceeded to Sandy Hook, whence he passed his army over to New York. This transit was effected by means of a fleet under Lord Howe, which had arrived off the Hook on the 28th of June.
Upon the day of battle the French fleet, under Count D'Estaing, having on board a respectable body of land forces, made the coast off Chincoteague Inlet. Had it arrived a few days earlier its superior force would have shut Lord Howe and the British fleet in the Delaware, and the censure of the army under Sir Henry Clinton would, probably, have followed. The Count proceeded to Sandy Hook for the purpose of attacking the British fleet in port, and should this be found impracticable, to make an attempt on Rhode Island. The first was defeated by the shoalness of the bar at the mouth of the harbor.
Another account of the battle closes by stating that after the terrible reprimand of General Lee by the Commander-in-chief, that officer, however much he had erred, bore himself with great, though boastful gallantry throughout the remainder of the action. Enough, that from the moment of Washington's coming, however hard to undo the error of an hour, the tide of battle remained at a standstill if it did not at once flow in favor of the patriots. When the night fell the palm of assured victory was almost within the grasp of the patriot commander, and only the one question remained whether Clinton was or was not too much crippled to resume his march towards Sandy Hook. Only the broken character of the ground thwarted Washington's intention of testing his strength by yet another attack after nightfall; with such impediments, and in the exhausted state of his troops, the second attack was deferred until morning. Both forces lay on their arms very near each other, but a little west of Monmouth Court House, when the night came on; but when the morning broke the British camp was deserted and the harassed hosts of Clinton were beyond the Court House and out of reach, having left so silently that even General Poor, in command of the American advanced corps, had no suspicion of the intention or its fulfillment. With this departure and virtual escape of the British, necessarily the combat was at an end. Clinton pursued his way by the hills of Middletown to Sandy Hook, and the fleet of Lord Howe, which bore his troops away to New York; and Washington - his enemy driven from the Jerseys if no more - marched northward with his army to New Brunswick, and thence to the Hudson.
The enemy's loss, it is said, was Lieutenant-Colonel
Hon. H. Monckton, Captain Gore, Lieutenants Vaughan
and Kennedy, four sergeants and fifty-seven rank and
file killed; three sergeants and fifty-six rank and file
died from fatigue; Colonel Trelawney, Lieutenant-Colonel
Simcoe, Major Gardner, Captains Cathcart, Bereton,
Willis, Leighton, Powell, Bellue and Ditmas, and Lieutenants
Kelly, Paumier, Goroffe, Desborough and Gilchrist,
seven sergeants, one hundred and forty-eight
rank and file wounded; and seven sergeants and sixty-one
rank and file missing.* The American army lost
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* The militia had returned to their homes immediately after the action.
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Lieutenant-Colonel Bonner, Major Dickinson, three captains,
three lieutenants, one sergeant, seven matrosses,
one bombardier and fifty-two rank and rile killed; two
colonels, nine captains, six lieutenants, one ensign, one
adjutant, nine sergeants, one gunner, ten matrosses and
one hundred and twenty-two rank and file wounded;
five sergeants, one matross, and one hundred and twenty-six
rank and file missing, many of whom, who had been
overcome by the heat, afterwards came in.